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Silent Order: The temporal turn in critical International Relations 
 
Andrew R. Hom 
University of Edinburgh 
 
Forthcoming in Millennium: Journal of International Studies (2018) 46:3, conference issue – 
‘International Relations and the Politics of Time’ 
 
Abstract 
Recently, more and more International Relations (IR) scholars have begun to recognize time 
explicitly as a political phenomenon and an important element of IR theorizing. Spanning 
different approaches and substantive concerns, their efforts suggest that IR is taking a 
‘temporal turn’. This is most evident in the field’s critical wing, which has expanded our 
perspective on time and challenged temporalities associated with sovereign politics and 
mainstream theories. However, critical treatments of time also manifest four discursive 
habits – two targets of criticism and two alternatives – that reproduce hidden tensions and 
contradictions detrimental to the temporal turn. First, scholars incoherently denounce 
timeless visions of politics. Second, attacks on linear time obscure a variety of hegemonic 
temporalities and reproduce assumptions critics wish to challenge. Third, advocates of 
heterotemporality amass woolly alternatives, foreclosing analysis and dialogue. Finally, 
times of rupture recapitulate a liberal-idealism that depoliticizes temporal enquiry just when 
it could be pushing the politics of time further. These habits hamstring conceptual 
development and critical IR’s ability to contribute distinctive perspectives to a field growing 
increasingly interested in time. To redress this, the paper identifies and sharpens critical IR’s 
temporal tensions, shows how they encourage particular visions of time and politics, and 
suggests initial steps toward maximizing the critical potential of time. 
 
Introduction  
International Relations (IR) has always been concerned with temporal phenomena. Nuclear 
end times and enduring peace; modernization and long cycles; longitudinal statistics and the 
uses of history; the interwar, postcolonialism, and postpositivism; and the quest for accurate 
predictions all involve time. Recently, more scholars have begun to explicitly acknowledge 
this, moving time to the forefront of thinking about global politics. Thanks to seminal 
provocations by James der Derian1 and R.B.J. Walker,2 poststructural interventions by Jenny 
Edkins3 and Kimberly Hutchings,4 the rise of historical institutionalism5 and Bayesian 
																																																						
1 James der Derian, ‘The (S)Pace of International Relations: Simulation, Surveillance, and Speed,’ 
International Studies Quarterly 34, no. 3 (1990): 295–310. 
2 R. B. J. Walker, Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1993); After the Globe, Before the World (Abingdon: Routledge, 2009). 
3 Jenny Edkins, Trauma and the Memory of Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003). 
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statistics,6 and a number of more recent works,7 IR now engages time as a theoretical tool and 
political phenomenon in its own right. Complemented by a growing number of time-oriented 
panels at academic gatherings and agenda-setting efforts like this special issue, these 
developments suggest that IR is indeed entering a ‘temporal turn.’8  
 
Institutionalist and statistical developments notwithstanding, this turn’s primary vector 
emanates from critical IR, which has paid the earliest and most sustained attention to time. 
For reasons of quantity and quality, it is impossible to do justice to this ever-expanding 
literature,9 which tackles political economy,10 security,11 identity and Self/Other dynamics,12 
citizenship,13 cities and cinema,14 continental philosophy,15 and methodology,16 among 
others. What binds these works together is that they find in time a natural ally against 
sovereign politics and mainstream theorizing. That is, critical IR scholars turn to time as a 
																																																																																																																																																																								
4 Kimberly Hutchings, Time and World Politics: Thinking the Present (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 2008). 
5 See Orfeo Fioretos, ‘Historical Institutionalism in International Relations,’ International 
Organization 65, no. 02 (2011): 367–399, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818311000002. 
6 See Christopher McIntosh, ‘Theory across Time: The Privileging of Time-Less Theory in 
International Relations,’ International Theory 7, no. 3 (2015): 466–68. 
7 In addition to the works discussed below, see David M. Edelstein, Over the Horizon: Time, 
Uncertainty, and the Rise of Great Powers (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2017). 
8 Felix Berenskoetter, ‘Reclaiming the Vision Thing: Constructivists as Students of the Future,’ 
International Studies Quarterly 55, no. 3 (2011): 664.  
9 For overviews, see Hutchings, Time; Tim Stevens, Cyber Security and the Politics of Time 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 36–41; see also Andrew R. Hom, ‘Timing Is Everything: 
Toward a Better Understanding of Time and International Politics,’ International Studies Quarterly 62, no. 1 
(2018): 70, https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqx090. 
10 David L. Blaney and Naeem Inayatullah, Savage Economics: Wealth, Poverty and the Temporal 
Walls of Capitalism (Abingdon: Routledge, 2010). 
11 Stevens, Cyber Security; Liam P.D. Stockdale, ‘Imagined Futures and Exceptional Presents: A 
Conceptual Critique of "Pre-Emptive Security"', Global Change, Peace & Security 25, no. 2 (2013): 141–57, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/14781158.2013.774342; Andrew R. Hom, ‘Angst Springs Eternal: Dangerous Times and 
the Dangers of Timing the "Arab Spring,"’ Security Dialogue 47, no. 2 (2016): 165–83. 
12 Ty Solomon, ‘Time and Subjectivity in World Politics,’ International Studies Quarterly 58, no. 4 
(2014): 671–81; Andrew R. Hom and Ty Solomon, ‘Timing, Identity, and Emotion in International Relations,’ 
in Time, Temporality, and Global Politics, ed. Andrew R. Hom et al. (Bristol, UK: e-International Relations, 
2016), 20–37.  
13 Michael J. Shapiro, ‘National Times and Other Times: Re-Thinking Citizenship,’ Cultural Studies 
14, no. 1 (2000): 79–98, https://doi.org/10.1080/095023800334995; ‘Time, Disjuncture, and Democratic 
Citizenship,’ in Democracy and Vision: Sheldon Wolin and the Vicissitudes of the Political, ed. Aryeh 
Botwinick and William E. Connolly (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001); Angharad Closs 
Stephens, “‘Seven Million Londoners, One London": National and Urban Ideas of Community in the Aftermath 
of the 7 July 2005 Bombings in London,’ Alternatives: Global, Local, Political 32, no. 2 (2007): 155–76, 
https://doi.org/10.1177/030437540703200201; ‘Citizenship without Community: Time, Design and the City,’ 
Citizenship Studies 14, no. 1 (2010): 31–46. 
14 Michael J. Shapiro, The Time of the City (Abingdon: Routledge, 2010); Politics and Time (Malden, 
MA: Polity, 2016). 
15 Hutchings, Time; Tom Lundborg, Politics of the Event: Time, Movement, Becoming (Abingdon: 
Routledge, 2011). 
16 McIntosh, ‘Theory’; Hutchings, Time, 81–105; Andrew R. Hom, ‘Reckoning Ruin: International 
Relations and the Problem of Time’ (Edinburgh, n.d.). 
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means of destabilizing hegemonic foundations—the international system, the logics of 
modernity, rationalist social science, to name a few.17 On this view, exploring time is an 
important way of ‘being critical,’18 it is useful for ‘shattering [the] systems of judgment’ on 
which conventional politics depends.19  
 
As the many works already referenced indicate, critical IR scholars have been very successful 
putting time to work. But for all their individual merits and collective dynamism, critical IR 
treatments of time also manifest four discursive habits or ‘rhetorical commonplaces’ worth 
scrutinizing.20 The first two are prominent targets of criticism, the latter two prevalent 
alternatives. While each habit includes innovative research on time, this paper argues that 
each also reproduces hidden problems. First, scholars challenge ‘timeless’ visions of politics 
without a coherent notion of the meaning or stakes of the term. Second, their denunciations of 
‘linear time’ reify, totalize, and obscure a wide variety of powerful temporalities. Both of 
these habits unintentionally reproduce dominant assumptions about time. Third, the ways that 
exponents of ‘heterotemporality’ amass woolly temporal alternatives threatens to render 
critical IR a closed shop. Finally, theorists embrace temporalities of ‘rupture’ to challenge 
hegemonic logics but end up recapitulating a liberal-idealism that depoliticizes analysis just 
when it could be pushing the politics of time further.  
 
This situation leaves critical IR’s temporal turn vulnerable to three charges. First, it supports 
Augustine’s observation that we easily grasp time until asked to explicate it.21 Second, it 
recalls a general criticism of social theory, which because ‘its referents are so diverse … 
often obscures rather than creates understanding’ and thus ‘threatens to become 
																																																						
17 Neither the ‘critical project’ nor ‘IR’ are discretely bounded. Here ‘critical IR’ refers to postmodern, 
poststructural, postcolonial, and broadly postpositivist thinking about global politics. This follows several of my 
key interlocutors, who self-identify as ‘critical’ scholars self-consciously writing about or against the academic 
field of ‘International Relations’ e.g. McIntosh, ‘Theory’; Walker, Inside/Outside; Jenny Edkins, ‘Novel 
Writing in International Relations: Openings for a Creative Practice,’ Security Dialogue 44, no. 4 (2013): 281–
97, https://doi.org/10.1177/0967010613491304; Tom Lundborg, ‘The Limits of Historical Sociology: Temporal 
Borders and the Reproduction of the "Modern" Political Present,’ European Journal of International Relations 
22, no. 1 (2016): 99–121, https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066115575399.  
18 Aoileann Ní Mhurchú and Reiko Shindo, ‘Being Critical and Imaginative in International Relations,’ 
in Critical Imaginations in International Relations, ed. Aoileann Ní Mhurchú and Reiko Shindo (Abingdon: 
Routledge, 2016), 2–3; Tom Lundborg, ‘Time,’ in Critical Imaginations in International Relations, ed. 
Aoileann Ní Mhurchú and Reiko Shindo (Abingdon: Routledge, 2016), 117; cf. Hom, ‘Timing Is Everything,’ 
71. 
19 Shapiro, Politics and Time, preface. 
20 John Shotter, Conversational Realities: Constructing Life through Language (London: Sage, 1994). 
21 Augustine, Confessions (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 2011) bk.11:xiv:17. 
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meaningless.’22 Third, it evokes the auteur’s claim that the most important consideration for a 
term of reference is not whether anyone ‘knows what it means’ but whether ‘it’s provocative, 
it gets the people going.’23 By shared intuitions, loose language, or rhetorical provocation, 
these issues dull the edge of critical work on time. To begin re-sharpening it, the main 
sections below unpack the meanings housed in our four temporal habits and examine what 
work they do in the critical project.24 More specifically, I scrutinize how each habit names 
and organises phenomenological features by placing them within a discursive structure or 
language game that produces specific meanings and particular visions of politics.25 The 
sections are illustrative rather than exhaustive. They feature particularly well-developed 
instances that help clarify the contours and consequences of critical IR’s discourse of time. 
  
While inspired by and self-identifying with critical IR, I am concerned that its habituated 
tensions threaten the temporal turn with centrifugal disarray by closing down meaningful 
dialogue and isolating researches to the detriment of intellectual coherence and sustained 
engagement – both with time as a fundamental element of social life and with the wider IR 
audience that stands to benefit from critical knowledge of time.26 These habits also 
contravene important critical commitments. My aim therefore is not to repudiate critical IR’s 
temporal turn or any of its constituents but rather to boost its momentum by ‘radical critique’, 
which involves ‘identifying and sharpening its symptomatic tensions and contradictions’27 as 
a first step toward resolving them or making them more productive. 
 
Timelessness 
For many years, time functioned in IR as an intuitive backdrop for political processes or a 
variable readily operationalized by scholars inclined to search for enduring causal factors or 
to propound static, cyclical, and determinate accounts of international politics. So although 
the field depended on time, it remained vulnerable to charges that it could not deal with time 
																																																						
22 Robert King Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure (Simon and Schuster, 1968), 39.  
23 Josh Gordon and Will Speck, Blades of Glory (Paramount Pictures, 2007). 
24 These discussions draw inspiration from the ‘basic Socratic’ question, ‘What do you mean when you 
say _____ ?’; see Hannah Arendt, The Life of the Mind: Thinking: Vols 1&2 (San Diego: Harcourt, 1981), 185; 
and a seminal critique of critical security studies, see Jef Huysmans, ‘Security! What Do You Mean? From 
Concept to Thick Signifier,’ European Journal of International Relations 4, no. 2 (1998): 226–55, 
https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066198004002004. 
25 Felix Berenskoetter, ‘Approaches to Concept Analysis,’ Millennium 45, no. 2 (2017): 154, 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0305829816651934; also Cecelia Lynch, Interpreting International Politics (New York: 
Routledge, 2014), 15.  
26 See Hom, ‘Timing Is Everything,’ 71. 
27 Patchen Markell, ‘Books in Review: Philosophy and Real Politics by Raymond Geuss,’ Political 
Theory 38, no. 1 (2010): 175, https://doi.org/10.1177/0090591709348870. 
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because its theories did not allow for historical variation and further encouraged a view of the 
future as knowable and controllable.28 These charges had substantive merit in many cases but 
were unhelpfully subsumed under a roomy and murky discourse of ‘timelessness.’ Among 
numerous referents, timelessness signifies axiomatic logic, generalizability, and scientism in 
general;29 transhistorical continuity and the absence of historical context;30 cycles or the 
‘regular beat’ of a recurring series;31 and the veneration of contemporary agendas by 
reference to long-dead thinkers.32 
 
These references make intuitive sense but do not withstand closer scrutiny. Universal, 
generalizable, and transhistorical qualities, much like venerable traditions, indicate something 
that holds in all or most times. Far from timeless, they are more accurately always timely, or 
perhaps ‘timeful’, for they are pertinent to any situation. Diagnoses of continuity, cycles, 
rhythms, or a lack of context depend upon some temporal passage against which the pattern 
or absence of variation manifests as such. Here we might recall a classical reductio ad 
absurdum argument against timelessness: if ‘the time is the same, there is after all no 
recurrence.’33 Finally, only by presuming some threshold of sufficiently temporal content 
(whatever that might mean) or that time equates with pure difference can these examples of 
‘timelessness’ evoke an absence of temporality.  
 
In critical work and beyond, conflating intrinsically temporal phenomena with timelessness 
produces strange formulations, such as a ‘timeless world in which concepts travel easily back 
and forth through the years’,34 or the timeless ‘monotony’ of ‘reproductive’ power relations35 
																																																						
28 John M. Hobson, ‘What’s at Stake in ‘Bringing Historical Sociology Back into International 
Relations’? Transcending ‘Chronofetishism’ and ‘Tempocentrism’ in International Relations,’ in Historical 
Sociology of International Relations, ed. Stephen Hobden and John M. Hobson (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2002), 3–41. 
29 Ibid., 10–12. 
30 Ibid., 30; Blaney and Inayatullah, Savage Economics, 190; Lundborg, ‘Limits,’ 102; McIntosh, 
‘Theory,’ 477; Andrew R. Hom and Brent J. Steele, ‘Open Horizons: The Temporal Visions of Reflexive 
Realism,’ International Studies Review 12, no. 2 (2010): 280. 
31 Hobson, ‘What’s at Stake,’ 30. 
32 See Barry Buzan, ‘The Timeless Wisdom of Realism?,’ in International Theory: Positivism and 
Beyond, ed. Steve Smith, Ken Booth, and Marysia Zalewski (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 
47–65. 
33 Richard Sorabji, Time, Creation, and the Continuum: Theories in Antiquity and the Early Middle 
Ages (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006), 184 emph. added. 
34 Cameron G. Thies, ‘A Pragmatic Guide to Qualitative Historical Analysis in the Study of 
International Relations,’ International Studies Perspectives 3, no. 4 (2002): 364, https://doi.org/10.1111/1528-
3577.t01-1-00099 emph. added. 
35 Stanley H. Hoffmann, ‘International Relations: The Long Road to Theory,’ World Politics 11, no. 3 
(1959): 350. 
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or ‘“what is now is the same as what was, which in turn is the same as what will be.”’36 
Again, these descriptions appear ‘timeless’ only against some background temporal 
passage.37 Indeed, in most cases, ‘timelessness’ mobilizes relative rather than absolute 
sameness for rhetorical effect rather than analytical development. Only rarely do IR scholars 
use ‘timelessness’ coherently to mark the absence of any change or passing at all.38 All other 
invocations are temporally dubious because ‘even the most static and repetitive accounts of 
how international politics works’ assume and reproduce ‘some temporal patterning.’39  
 
The uses of ‘timelessness’ 
References to ‘timelessness’ clearly offer a trope for grasping a range of phenomena with 
different connotations for different people. Moreover, while almost entirely unacknowledged, 
most invocations of ‘timelessness’ indicate a measure of insulation from the problem of time 
– or time’s supposedly natural tendency to bring change, dissolution, and death.40 For 
instance, consider transhistoricality and generality. As Chris McIntosh notes, a hypothesis or 
rule is ‘time-less’ if it applies ‘across time’, if particularity, difference, and uniqueness do not 
affect its validity.41 Put differently, timeless claims are context-invariant in a way that renders 
them free from the presumably differentiating effects of time’s passage.42 This is perhaps the 
most common meaning of ‘timelessness’, and McIntosh elaborates it further than anyone 
else. But this meaning depends upon an implicit problematisation of time in that it assumes 
contextual variation goes naturally with time and that these adversely impact hypotheses and 
rules – that while humans establish connections, time dissolves them. Indeed, only if 
‘timeless’ means being ‘safe from the vagaries of time’ – chaos and decay – and thus ‘valid 
regardless of time’43 can this term indicate something that is both outside of time and 
applicable in every time, as most IR invocations do. 
 
																																																						
36 McIntosh, ‘Theory,’ 477. 
37 Cycles may also produce novel changes, see Paul Pierson, Politics in Time: History, Institutions, and 
Social Analysis (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004), 59.  
38 e.g. Martin Griffiths, Realism, Idealism, and International Politics, Reprint (Abingdon: Routledge, 
1995), 42–43. 
39 Hutchings, Time, 93, 97; also McIntosh, ‘Theory.’ 
40 Hom, ‘Angst Springs Eternal,’ 170–73; ‘Reckoning Ruin,’ Introduction. 
41 McIntosh, ‘Theory,’ 471; see also Lundborg, ‘Limits,’ 102. 
42 McIntosh, ‘Theory,’ 474. Thus, temporality makes ‘context more contextual’; Ibid., 489. 
43 Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics in the Twentieth Century, Volume 1: The Decline of Democratic 
Politics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962), 48, 105, 3 emph. added. McIntosh qualifies ‘time-less’ as 
follows: ‘It is not my contention that context does not matter at all, rather that it only matters in an appreciable 
historical sense from which time has no real discernable effect on its own’; Christopher McIntosh, ‘Theorizing 
the Interim: IR as Study of the Present’ (Annandale-on-Hudson, NY, unpublished book manuscript), 65; see 
also McIntosh, ‘Theory,’ 468n2.  
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Although references to ‘timelessness’ raise few eyebrows in critical IR, its range, 
incoherence, and silent presumptions suggests that upon encountering such utterances we 
should ask for clarification about its constituent features and, further, scrutinize what sort of 
work it does in the discourse in question. The point here is not to arrive at a single definition, 
but rather that scholars would benefit from knowing whether they are even speaking of the 
same thing in the same way. As it stands, with only the rare exception,44 ‘timeless’ in IR 
serves as a fuzzy charge easily lobbed at static theories, claims about enduring value, or 
aspirations to scientific status, but not a carefully worked out conceptual tool. Moreover, IR’s 
discourse of ‘timelessness’ operates at a very high level of abstraction dependent on shared 
assumptions about which processes, events, and actors matter enough for their patternings to 
stand out against the wider passage of time and be dubbed timeless. 
 
There are no comprehensively frozen ‘snapshot’ accounts of international politics, as a 
coherent use of ‘timeless’ would entail. Even the archetypal example of ‘timeless’ neorealism 
is bound up with temporality. Kenneth Waltz lamented ‘classical thinking’ as too ‘static’ to 
grapple with the end of the Cold War and its implications ‘in the present and … in the 
future.’45 He developed structural theory expressly ‘to peer into the future … among the 
unknowns that abound.’46 It would stretch the term past the breaking point to tabulate these 
efforts as matters of ‘timelessness.’47 Moreover, dispensing with this term would allow critics 
to sharpen their charges against such approaches by elaborating and differentiating the 
problems with transhistorical knowledge claims, recurrent accounts, and other varietals of 
‘timelessness.’ It would also destabilize laudatory proposals to develop ‘timeless’ theory as 
the key to scientific progress. Instead of proclaiming or profaning ‘timelessness’, the stronger 
move for critical scholars is to deny timelessness, full stop, and thereby move core 
theoretical, epistemological, and methodological debates onto a thoroughly temporal terrain, 
one currently dominated by critical work. 
 
 
 
 
																																																						
44 Hutchings, Time, 97; McIntosh, ‘Theory.’ 
45 Kenneth N. Waltz, ‘The Emerging Structure of International Politics,’ International Security 18, no. 
2 (1993): 55–56, https://doi.org/10.2307/2539097. 
46 Ibid., 79. 
47 ‘Timelessness’ thus works as a ‘slogan’ or ‘“fundamental code of culture”’ in that it characterizes 
present ‘experiential content’ but also looks backwards and forwards, Berenskoetter, ‘Approaches,’ 157. 
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Linear time 
Even more than timelessness, ‘linear time’ plays the bête noire in critical IR.48 This 
appellation subsumes a huge variety of temporal phenomena associated with hegemonic 
logics, including but not limited to state sovereignty,49 national citizenship,50 security,51 
Enlightenment capitalism and colonialism,52 history,53 patriarchy,54 western calendars and 
clocks,55 neopositivism,56 progress and rationality,57 and narrative.58 How precisely these 
issues link to or instantiate ‘linear time’ – and how this supports hegemony – typically 
remains unsaid. Moreover, the rare qualifications of ‘linear time’ add little in the way of 
clarity. Linear time is ‘bounded’, ‘rational’, and ‘homogeneous.’59 It depends on heroic 
narratives of specific deeds but is also a smooth ‘continuum’ moving us ‘steadily from 
moment to moment’ or, relatedly, an ‘empty’ container for events.60 These visions of linear 
time contrast discontinuity.61 Yet elsewhere linear time associates with discontinuity, with 
discrete parcels of past, present, and future sometimes normatively valuated as progress.62 
This distinguishes linear time from continuous, pre-modern, or indigenous temporalities, 
which are ‘non-linear’ because they co-mingle the past and future in each present and thus 
admit no temporal borders.63 Occasionally, ‘linear’ indicates both continuity and 
																																																						
48 See Samuel A. Chambers, ‘Untimely Politics Avant La Lettre: The Temporality of Social 
Formations,’ Time & Society 20, no. 2 (2011): 198, https://doi.org/10.1177/0961463X11399174. 
49 Walker, Inside/Outside; Shapiro, ‘National Times’; Edkins, Trauma, 15–16; Lundborg, Politics, 78, 
86; on linear state time, cf. Edkins, ‘Novel Writing,’ 285; and Hidemi Suganami, ‘Narrative Explanation and 
International Relations: Back to Basics,’ Millennium: Journal of International Studies 37, no. 2 (2008): 352. 
50 Shapiro, ‘National Times,’ 89; Stephens, ‘Citizenship,’ 34. 
51 Edkins, Trauma, 19; Lundborg, Politics, 46–57; Stockdale, ‘Imagined Futures,’ 154. 
52 Blaney and Inayatullah, Savage Economics, 191; Edkins, Trauma, 31–32. 
53 Lundborg, Politics; ‘Limits’; but cf. ‘true Historical events’ in Antoine Bousquet, ‘Time Zero: 
Hiroshima, September 11 and Apocalyptic Revelations in Historical Consciousness,’ Millennium: Journal of 
International Studies 34, no. 3 (2006): 740. 
54 Julia Kristeva, Alice Jardine, and Harry Blake, ‘Women’s Time,’ Signs 7, no. 1 (1981): 13–35. 
55 Shapiro, ‘National Times,’ 82; Andrew R. Hom, ‘Hegemonic Metronome: The Ascendancy of 
Western Standard Time,’ Review of International Studies 36, no. 4 (2010): 1164. 
56 Shapiro, ‘National Times,’ 83. 
57 Stephens, ‘Citizenship,’ 34, 37. 
58 Solomon, ‘Time and Subjectivity,’ 673; Edkins, ‘Novel Writing.’ 
59 Edkins, Trauma, 229. 
60 Shapiro, Politics and Time, 85; cf. Edkins, ‘Novel Writing,’ 285 and 286; Edkins, Trauma, 95, xiv–
xv, 229; Stephens, ‘Citizenship,’ 34. The linear-homogeneous link is consistent with some contrasts between 
linear time and discontinuity, which is ‘ephemeral’, ‘fleeting’, and ‘disjunctive’; Ibid., 32; Shapiro, ‘National 
Times,’ 84; but does not explicate how linearity also comports with discontinuity, as in Shapiro, Politics and 
Time, 72–73. 
61 Stephens, ‘Citizenship,’ 32; Shapiro, ‘National Times,’ 84. 
62 Blaney and Inayatullah, Savage Economics; Hom and Steele, ‘Open Horizons,’ 276–78. For an 
analogous reading of linear time establishing both collective identity and atomized individuals, see Edkins, 
‘Novel Writing,’ 287. 
63 Ibid.; Lundborg, Politics, 110. This is distinguished without differentiation from the smooth, ‘linear’ 
continuum just mentioned. 
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discontinuity, as when heroic national narratives produce discrete succession and time as 
‘continuous and linear.’64  
 
Critical scholars also contrast linear time with cyclical or circular temporalities.65 By this way 
of thinking, cyclicality problematizes the arrow-like trajectory of linear time’s forward thrust, 
a movement which complements the logics of nationalism, patriarchy, and causation.66 These 
alternatives to linearity as such are not especially coherent. In cyclical time the past ‘“directly 
effects the present and the future”’.67 This is very much a causal statement.68 Moreover, 
rendered as simplistic binaries, linear/cyclical distinctions are spurious: a cycle refers to an 
undulating line or sine wave,69 and the further in we zoom, the straighter it appears. Finally, 
like invocations of ‘timelessness’ a basic sense of linearity facilitates rather than precludes 
cyclical imputations, providing the serial baseline passage against which recurrence resolves 
as such.  
 
Other critical alternatives to linear time also depend on linearity inasmuch as they propound a 
lineal-spatial metaphor and/or assume some sense of past, present, and future (or before and 
after). For example, duration, chronotopicity, and retroactive and anticipatory meaning-
making imply, respectively: the serial connectability of experiential moments, a spatialized 
and gridded shape, a clear sense of backward and forward.70 Or consider time as ‘becoming’, 
which refutes linearity because it moves ‘in different directions at the same time, into the past 
and into the future.’71 Nothing about ‘linear’ per se opposes this movement or the sense of 
																																																						
64 Edkins, Trauma, 34. 
65 e.g. ibid., 1–19; Edkins, ‘Novel Writing,’ 288.  
66 Edkins, Trauma; Stephens, ‘“Seven Million",’ 169; Lundborg, ‘Limits,’ 114. Thus dissidence 
involves ‘encircling’ political traumas to resist gentrifying heroic narratives, although cf. Hom, ‘Timing Is 
Everything,’ 77. 
67 Stephens, ‘“Seven Million",’ 169 emph. added; also Blaney and Inayatullah, Savage Economics, 
190; cf. Anne McClintock, ‘The Angel of Progress: Pitfalls of the Term "Post-Colonialism,"' Social Text, no. 
31/32 (1992): 85, 91. 
68 On poststructural causality, see Milja Kurki and Hidemi Suganami, ‘Towards the Politics of Causal 
Explanation: A Reply to the Critics of Causal Inquiries,’ International Theory 4, no. 03 (2012): 400–429, 
https://doi.org/10.1017/S1752971912000127. 
69 If time itself were cyclical or circular, we would repeat experiences exactly as before, which would 
preclude apprehending this very phenomenon; Sorabji, Time, 184–85. 
70 Solomon, ‘Time and Subjectivity,’ 673 contrasts this with the ‘linearity’ of a sentence, implying 
unidirectionality, segmentation, and straightness. But like narratives, sentences compose an interpretive gestalt – 
they makes sense as a whole and require us to double back so that chronological endpoints also provide 
hermeneutic conclusions; see Paul Ricoeur, Time and Narrative, Volume 1, ed. David Pellauer (Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press, 1984), 41. 
71 Lundborg, Politics, 3; ‘Time,’ 263. 
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continual development evoked by ‘becoming.’ As before, becoming only resolves as such 
against a basic linear comparator. 
 
Non-linear proposals based on time-as-becoming are even more explicitly linear. Aion 
describes the ‘pure’ and ‘empty form’ of a ‘straight line’,72 which vitiates ontologies of 
presence by stretching out ‘limitless in either direction.’73 It is the movement by which ‘the 
line’ frees itself from the punctual present so as to ‘[c]onstantly flee … in different 
directions.’74 These characterizations depend on a classical notion of linearity: ‘a line that is 
single, straight and infinite in both directions.’75 Yet aion’s champions pit these very qualities 
directly against the state’s linear time, in particular its ‘linear timelines and distinctions 
between before and after.’76 Now it may be that they mean aion to challenge a specifically 
discontinuous and unitary form of linearity, but as the summary above showed, these 
qualities do not exhaust the possible meanings of linearity. Similarly, it is difficult to 
understand how the ‘pure event’ associated with aion refuses distinctions between before and 
after but depends on notions of the past and future. Something more is going on with the 
aionic challenge to state and historical time, but most of the grappling remains hidden by a 
discourse based on a number of silent, shared assumptions about just what ‘linear’ 
encompasses.   
  
Similar problems stalk critical scholars’ interest in the non-linear ‘countertemporality’ of 
alternative knowledge genres.77 For instance, where linear state narratives close down 
political possibility, films are ‘powerful [because they do] not try to bring [experiences] 
together in order to form a unity.’78 Now alternative cinematic accounts of events may indeed 
challenge hegemonic interpretations, but to gloss them as ‘non-linear’ because they possess 
no ‘clear temporal order that can be used … to determine the sequence of images and sounds 
in accordance with a homogeneous movement or a narrative that takes us from the past to the 
present’ forgets the linearity of the artistic medium itself and the sovereign practices involved 
																																																						
72 Lundborg, Politics, 17. 
73 Deleuze, quoted in Hutchings, Time, 69. 
74 Lundborg, Politics, 12; Hutchings, Time, 69–70. 
75 Proclus, quoted in Francis Macdonald Cornford, Plato’s Cosmology: The Timaeus of Plato 
Translated with a Running Commentary (London: Routledge, 1937), 103. Intriguingly, others interpret 
Deleuzean time as cut from the same ‘passive’ cloth as the ‘physical time’ of the straight line; Paul Ricoeur, 
From Text to Action, trans. Kathleen Blamey and John B. Thompson (London: Continuum, 2008), 207. 
76 Lundborg, Politics, 21, also 3, 12, 29. 
77 Shapiro, ‘Time, Disjuncture,’ 241; Lundborg, Politics; Edkins, ‘Novel Writing.’ 
78 Lundborg, Politics, 89. 
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in the ‘series of cutting and sequencing’ that the auteur uses to ‘disrupt the very notion of a 
whole.’79 It makes no sense to claim that cinema’s ‘time-image’ produces ‘“images without 
subordinating them to coherent movements and linear timelines”’80 unless we ignore the 
series of singular images that compose a film and have in mind a specific and particular 
understanding of linearity. Just as hegemonic narratives construct coherent unity, films 
purposefully construct a non-coherent storyline by manipulating an intrinsically linear series. 
It is this structural quality that led earlier time scholars to attack determinism by charging that 
it ‘denied time and freedom by rolling up the future in the present the way the end of a film is 
already determined at the start of the reel.’81 Such tensions would not be so conspicuous if 
critical scholars did not persist in positioning them against a murky, libertine notion of ‘linear 
time.’82  
 
The uses of ‘linear time’, or which line(s)? 
It is not always clear what ‘linear’ adds to reflections on dominant and dissident politics. 
Occasionally, it signifies discrete temporal parcels of the past, present, and future;83 
asymmetry or uni-directionality;84 or the upward progress of human history.85 Alternatively, 
it marks an objectivist approach to history as dead, buried, and knowable.86 This diversity is 
easily explained by the capaciousness of a metaphorical referent as ambiguous as ‘linear.’ As 
feminist scholars note, ‘linear’ can indicate ‘a finite segment, an infinite line, an indefinite 
line, a braid or multistranded line’;87 as well as diverse temporal perspectives – ‘time as 
project, teleology, … prospective unfolding; time as departure, progression, and arrival’; or a 
‘linear, cursive history.’88 It could also be easily elaborated: unilinear, rectilinear, curvilinear, 
multilinear, etc. Any of these qualifications would improve clarity and enable more 
systematic engagement by beginning to differentiate amongst the many linear times of 
politics.  
																																																						
79 Ibid., 90–92 emph. added; see Shapiro, Politics and Time, 19.  
80 Lundborg, Politics, 91; Shapiro, Politics and Time, 17. 
81 Bergson, quoted in Stephen Kern, The Culture of Time and Space: 1880-1918 (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1983), 101 emph. added. 
82 For discussions of other genres that depend on this same rhetorical flourish, see Shapiro, Politics and 
Time, 58, 73; also Shapiro, ‘Time, Disjuncture,’ 236; Lundborg, Politics; Edkins, ‘Novel Writing.’ 
83 e.g. Lundborg, Politics, 21. 
84 Hom and Steele, ‘Open Horizons,’ 276; Edkins, ‘Novel Writing,’ 287; Shapiro, Politics and Time, 
73; cf. Barbara Adam, Time (Cambridge: Polity, 2004), 32. 
85 Blaney and Inayatullah, Savage Economics; Hom and Steele, ‘Open Horizons.’ 
86 Stephens, ‘“Seven Million",’ 169. 
87 Carol J. Greenhouse, A Moment’s Notice: Time Politics Across Cultures (Cornell University Press, 
1996), 20. 
88 Kristeva, Jardine, and Blake, ‘Women’s Time,’ 16–17, 24. 
	 12	
 
Of the many meanings of linearity, one of the most common is a unitary time that excludes 
many subject positions and possibilities. If this seems unclear, it is because ‘the problem is 
not linear time as such’ but rather its presumptive link to ‘a view of the world as a totality’,89 
its ‘imaginary wholeness.’90 This is why it makes sense to embrace ‘an understanding of time 
as plural.’91 However, such qualifications are exceedingly rare in critical IR, which more 
often than not proceeds by assumption. For example, take this well-cited quote from the 
novelist Carlos Fuentes on local peasant farmer wisdom: ‘there is more than one time in the 
world, … there is another time existing alongside, above, underneath the linear time of the 
calendars of the West.’92 Absent important shared assumptions, linearity has little to do with 
this. The issue is singularity rather than linearity, a point ably demonstrated by the fact that 
Hutchings’ work on totalizing international political theories dispenses almost completely 
with ‘linear’ metaphors and instead works with the difference between ‘unitary’ political time 
and ‘heterotemporal’ alternatives (more on this below). 
 
Beyond conflations with unity, another set of assumptions underpins critical discussions of 
‘linear time.’ Many of the non/linear interpretations catalogued so far make sense only if we 
assume that ‘linear’ entails not just basic seriality but something more: straightness 
(rectilinearity) underpins cyclical alternatives’ non-linearity;93 straightness with direction 
(rectilinear asymmetry) the non-linearity of retroaction or doubling back;94 and singularity, 
straightness, direction, and improvement (unirectilinear progress) the non-linearity of 
ambivalent temporalities.95 What binds these diverse references to non/linearity together? A 
neopositivist understanding of linear time.96 
 
																																																						
89 Angharad Closs Stephens, ‘Beyond Imaginative Geographies: Critique, Cooptation and Imagination 
in the Aftermath of the War on Terror,’ in The New Violent Cartography: Geo-Analysis after the Aesthetic Turn, 
ed. Samson Opondo and Michael J. Shapiro (Abingdon: Routledge, 2012), 56. 
90 Edkins, ‘Novel Writing,’ 288. However, arch-unilinear histories of developmental progress also 
stress incompleteness, locating contemporary others ‘behind’ the exemplary self, see Blaney and Inayatullah, 
Savage Economics; Andrew R. Hom and Brent J. Steele, ‘Child’s Play: Temporal Discourse, Counterpower, and 
Environmental Politics,’ in Time and Violence in IR: (De)Fatalizing the Present, Forging Radical Alternatives, 
ed. Anna M. Agathangelou and Kyle Killian (Abingdon: Routledge, 2016), 189–204; Hom, ‘Angst Springs 
Eternal,’ 173–76. 
91 Stephens, ‘Citizenship,’ 34. 
92 Shapiro, ‘Time, Disjuncture,’ 236; ‘National Times,’ 82–83; Politics and Time, 16; Edkins, ‘Novel 
Writing,’ 289. 
93 Edkins, Trauma. 
94 Solomon, ‘Time and Subjectivity,’ 674; see also Blaney and Inayatullah, Savage Economics, 190.  
95 Lundborg, Politics, 109. 
96 e.g. Fioretos, ‘Historical Institutionalism,’ 379. 
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In statistical inference, ‘linear’ describes functions that compose additive and scalar 
transformations graphed by single, straight lines (e.g. y = α + βx + ε).97 It is a very specific, 
mathematically-founded, linearity associated almost exclusively with rigid, smooth surfaces 
and ‘homogeneous’ or flat relationships.98 Other shapes, like a ‘plane with a changing slope’ 
or exponential, logarithmic, and otherwise curved graphs (e.g. sine and cosine functions) are 
non-linear.99 This understanding of linearity also informs monocausal explanation, in which a 
principal input produces exclusive and proportionate changes in outcomes.100 And it is what 
grants clocks and calendars their sense of reckoning time per se by the regular accumulation 
of discrete quantities. This especially strict, neopositivist standard of linearity helps dissident 
phenomena resolve as non-linear.101 Although most critical scholars partake of this wider 
symbolic order of ‘non/linear’, none reflect on its neopositivist and mathematical 
foundations, leaving the dominant interpretation of linearity as singular, straight, and flat 
unchallenged and even re-affirmed by alternatives that only work as ‘non-linear’ within that 
interpretive frame. In trying to destabilize the ‘West’s “successive, linear, and 
[neo]positivistic notion of time”’,102 critical IR actually reinforces it at the level of basic 
concepts, further obscuring the historical, contingent and relatively recent temporal 
achievements from which the state’s ‘linear time’ springs.103 
 
The ‘linear/non-linear’ binary constitutes something of an orthodoxy in critical IR but withers 
under closer scrutiny. This section offered a glimpse of the striking diversity amongst both 
‘linear’ targets and ‘non-linear’ alternatives – enough that the distinction itself collapses 
under its own weight unless buttressed by additional, silent assumptions. In addition to 
relying on neopositivist meanings, a central irony here is that this critical orthodoxy relies on 
generalizing and totalizing moves – the conceptual frame of ‘linearity’ is so abstract and 
ambiguous that it accommodates and reduces a great temporal variety,104 making it seem that 
the relationship between time and hegemonic politics is a simple affair. The stronger and 
more critically reflexive approach would be to pluralize our account of linearity, to embrace 
																																																						
97 A polynomial function with a degree of two or more produces a ‘non-linear’, i.e. curved, graph. 
98 Will H. Moore and David A. Siegel, A Mathematics Course for Political and Social Research 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2013), 57. 
99 Ibid., 51, 56. 
100 McIntosh, ‘Theory,’ 485. 
101 E.g. Lundborg, ‘Limits,’ 112–13 reads the ‘multi-linear' qualities of interacting societies as 'non-
linear.’ 
102 Shapiro, ‘National Times,’ 83. 
103 Hom, ‘Timing Is Everything,’ 73–75. 
104 Berenskoetter, ‘Approaches,’ 154. 
	 14	
heterolinearity in explicit and systematic fashion. We need to systematically unpack and 
differentiate the many heroic histories, teloi, and other temporal relations bound up in 
hegemonic politics so as to systematically elaborate linear times and their alternatives instead 
of succumbing to the neopositivist line.  
 
Heterotemporality 
While many totalize linear time, critical IR scholars also support the move to develop a 
‘heterotemporal’ perspective that broadens the theoretical and practical horizons of 
international politics. Hutchings makes this case most forcefully, highlighting the sovereign 
politics implicated in unitary visions of time and arguing instead that because political life is 
necessarily heterotemporal, any theory wishing to do more than prop up hegemony must 
leave room for multiple, co-existing, and diverse understandings of time – especially those of 
women, subaltern, and other traditionally marginalized groups.105 Numerous critical scholars 
embrace variants of this position.106  
 
Arguments for heterotemporality are normatively compelling,107 and bolstered theoretically 
by the vast array of times that scholars have discovered and mobilized to problematize 
clocks, calendars, and heroic state narratives.108 As one observer notes: ‘Under the heading of 
a new thinking of time, we find a diverse set of names/concepts: duration, disruptive time, 
time as becoming, spectrality, time out of joint, untimeliness, hauntology.’109 Today this list 
only scratches the surface of critical IR, which also includes the chronos/kairos/aion 
philosophical triad,110 ‘eventful’ temporalities,111 temporal ‘decenteredness’,112 and ‘open’ 
and ‘closed’ temporalities.113 Critical scholars have also stocked the empirical storehouse 
with alternatives like ‘trauma time’,114 overlapping “temporal traces” of citizenship,115 
																																																						
105 Hutchings, Time, 162–64. 
106 Blaney and Inayatullah, Savage Economics, 7; Edkins, ‘Novel Writing,’ 289; Shapiro, Politics and 
Time, 15–17; Stephens, ‘Citizenship,’ 34; Ritu Vij, ‘Temporality, Civic Engagement, and Alterity Indo-Kei in 
Contemporary Japan,’ Alternatives: Global, Local, Political 37, no. 1 (2012): 9, 
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109 Chambers, ‘Untimely Politics,’ 198. 
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‘savage’ or indigenous time,116 and ‘private’ and ‘women’s’ time,117 among many others. 
These are intriguing additions. Yet they remain mostly isolated from each other because 
critical works primarily focus on discovery rather than synoptic analysis or cross-temporal 
dialogue.118 
 
If such dialogue were prioritized, even stalwart efforts would require clarification. Consider 
two complementary critiques of temporal Othering (the location of contemporary difference 
‘behind’ western civilization on a universal historical scale),119 which use ‘time travel’ quite 
differently. For Hutchings, the risk in theorizing world political time as unitary is that it 
positions the theorist as ‘a prophet and time-traveller’, occupying a privileged position 
between ‘determinism and god-like powers.’120 This position cashes out differently 
depending on the theory in question121 but produces authority and control by doing 
conceptual and often practical violence to other peoples and their lived times. Time travel is 
for Hutchings a hegemonic theoretical practice. 
 
On the other hand, Blaney and Inayatullah recommend ‘travels in time’ as a way to ‘reshape 
the past and future’ and then hold them up as ‘mirrors’ to a reified present.122 Their time 
travel is a deliberately anachronistic process that deploys forgotten, overlooked, or novel 
constructions to destabilize contemporary logics and thereby learn to live with our history 
and with each other more equitably. In Hutchings, time travel helps subordinate the 
subaltern;123 in Blaney and Inayatullah, it helps liberate them by revealing ‘the “internal 
alterity” of thought.’124 Time travel, then, is both a symptom of hegemony and its potential 
cure. At the very least, this calls for dialogue and elaboration—not so we settle on the 
meaning of time travel but to discover overlaps and tensions that might enrich each treatment 
and afford a more complex account of time traveling as a political resource and a modern 
conceptual device.125 
																																																						
116 Blaney and Inayatullah, Savage Economics, 186–90. 
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119  
120 Hutchings, Time, 95, 155. 
121 e.g. see ibid., 98 discussion of Bueno de Mesquita and Mearsheimer. 
122 Blaney and Inayatullah, Savage Economics, 196. 
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Blaney and Inayatullah’s proposal invites further scrutiny. They suggest we engage the 
‘savage times’ of hunter-gather experience to shatter the ‘mythic edifice of a universal history 
of human material and social progress’ and thereby enable more ethical modes of social 
exchange.126 Hunter-gatherers ‘experience and participate in time in terms of continuity, not 
disjuncture. Because the past is not separated from the present or the future, human society 
cannot be imagined in terms of some unfolding or developmental logic. Rather, ritual action 
creates and recreates time and the cosmos as the present’, and ‘“all that exists [derives] from 
a single, unchanging, timeless source.”’127 This encourages sharing over consumption, the 
responsible management of abundance rather than crisis and scarcity, and communal 
cohesion instead of material competition. Indeed, sharing in abundance grounds hunter-
gatherers ‘in the continuities of a timeless social space’, which generates ‘“spontaneous 
order”’ where modern development theory expects only disarray.128 
 
While intriguing, savage time underscores the tensions with time noted earlier. Blaney and 
Inayatullah pit it against linear time, but the ‘timeless’ quality they find here depends upon 
the ‘linear’ baseline temporality of capitalism – it is timeless because it is not accumulative or 
developmental. Their ‘timelessness’ further refers to a recollected past and communal future 
explicitly co-mingled with present experience. This only resonates as ‘timeless’ under one or 
both of two conditions. First, if we identify time with progressive disjuncture,129 then we can 
meaningfully link the appellation ‘timeless’ to its opposite. Otherwise, a ‘timeless time’ of 
‘continuity’ emerging from a ‘timeless social space’ of abundance begs elaboration to avoid 
beggaring belief, not least because continuity,130 emergence, and exchange are intrinsically 
temporal processes and concepts.131 Second, if we presume the problem of time (i.e. its 
intrinsic link to dissolution, see p. 000), then a societal order or context (time) that has 
devised a way to stave off the ‘erosion of time’ and thus offer the perpetual renewal of 
spontaneous organization and coexistence might appear timeless.132 Absent these 
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assumptions, it becomes hard to understand how reconvening experience via repetition and 
ritual mounts a ‘timeless’ challenge to modern, statist, ‘linear’ time.133 
 
Why heterotemporality matters in critical IR 
It is a boon rather than a bane that scholars locate such temporal variety in global politics. 
The problem is that this temporal cornucopia marks the fuzzy end of the story rather than a 
promising beginning.134 Many examples of time pluralism function as provocative 
metaphors, similes, or signifiers of larger phenomena, rather than carefully worked out 
concepts or connections. In this way, critical scholars champion heterotemporality but neglect 
time. This would be fine as far as it goes, except for two things. First, it would not go very far 
because proliferation is a poor substitute for engagement. Second, habitually evoking plural 
times without elaboration or dialogue presumes a lot of shared understandings between 
interlocutors. There is no guarantee we all possess the same hermeneutic toolkit. And even if 
we do grasp temporal meanings intuitively, this only encourages a situation where time 
utterances transmit information in a way that obscures their ‘wider order of meaning.’135 
Most of the conceptual action remains below the surface, a hallmark of an insider’s discourse 
or closed shop. This situation is problematic in a subfield committed to ‘multiple worlds’,136 
global dialogue, and to making the ‘familiar’ seem ‘strange.’137 
 
Even if we accept that time is a matter of interpretation all the way down, we can still unpack 
meanings and highlight ‘significant overlaps’ between various times.138 Moreover, as a 
pragmatic matter, our argumentation should still strive to be ‘sufficiently transparent for 
others to form their own judgments.’139 As with timelessness and linearity, the critical 
discourse of heterotemporality works by familiarity and common sense instead of clarity and 
elaboration. Having discovered a blooming multiplicity of times in political life, it only 
becomes more important to analyse them systematically.140 Doing so would not only enrich 
our understanding of specific temporal constructs, it would afford a more synoptic (if never 
total) view of the temporal dynamics of global politics. 
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Rupture 
Perhaps no temporality exemplifies the critical project more than that of ‘rupture’, or 
shocking and unprecedented moments of radical discontinuity. By unsettling the status quo 
and presenting possibilities for transformation, ruptures readily complement efforts to 
‘disrupt’ hegemonic logics. Interest in ruptures also flows from the empirical observation that 
a politics of clean relations between unified states obscures more than it reveals about the 
‘temporal junctures and disjunctures that every political collective encompasses’ in its 
illusion of wholeness and unity.141 To recover these, critical scholars take it as their task to 
explore alternative accounts and genres that ‘unsettle, disrupt, challenge; they refuse easy 
categorization and ask us to remain with uncertainty.’142 Doing so enables the theoretical 
discovery (or recovery) of ‘“ambivalent temporalit[ies]”’ via concepts that ‘disturb the 
universalizing pretensions’ of our ‘modern political present’ and ‘resist the closural impulses’ 
of hegemonic knowledge.143  
 
For example, we might think politics through the ‘pure event’, which admits no ‘overarching 
structure’ or ‘temporal borders’ and thus ‘lacks presence, meaning and identity.’144 These 
absences open up possibilities for escaping ‘violent practices of response’, ‘mundane forms 
of security’, and other well-worn ruts driving competition and conflict.145 As Tom Lundborg 
explains, the pure event allows us to ‘take seriously moments of rupture’ because it  
 
highlights the limits of any attempt to grasp or “comprehend” the event through, for 
example, long-term processes and largescale patterns. It points, moreover, to our 
inability to “anticipate” the future. … It breaks with any and all explanatory / 
interpretive frameworks, renders structures (“ideational” as well as “material”) open 
and necessarily incomplete, and disrupts the “present” in which the autonomous 
subject of history and reason is supposed to stand.146 
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All of this augurs ‘a future that is radically open, radically unknown and always potentially 
disruptive.’147 Here we might discover ‘the conditions under which something new is 
produced’ by exploring ‘alternative encounters with the event—encounters that do not submit 
to the standard lines and limits of history and instead open up to something completely 
different.’148 More specifically, we might encounter ‘the radically other’ and conditions 
productive of ‘another politics’, one that embraces the ‘continuous renegotiation of the 
aggregation of difference’ rather than the suffocating determinations of unity associated with 
linear time.149 
 
Critical scholars maintain that thinking through rupture does not involve re-interpreting 
shocking experiences or re-directing political processes, which would only substitute one 
closure for another, limit how we think about time and becoming, and thus constrain the 
horizons of ‘what kind of change is allowed to take place’ or ‘what form of life should be 
maintained.’150 At most, we might ask of ruptured time the same question put to works of art: 
‘does it both make some sort of political sense and produce a shock to sense from the way it 
resists meaning? Does it make productive political use of the way concepts in language do 
not hold?’151 Does it inspire ‘“a politics without denouement”’?152 
 
To support these inquiries, critical scholars develop ways of propping open the rupture to 
allow something genuinely novel to emerge organically. Lundborg proposes experimentation 
with Deleuzean ‘lines of flight’ that escape the present social field in part by shifting from 
‘molar’ (calculable/structural) to ‘molecular’ (particular) ways of thinking politics.153 For 
Edkins, this entails aesthetic ‘“local and occasional”’ explorations of how ‘a particular text 
disturbs a particular order’, which eschew any generalization or summary of lessons 
learned.154 Shapiro’s ‘aesthetic practice’ similarly emphasizes ‘disagreement’ and sublime in 
order to ‘resurrect’ the event and ‘summon’ further political ‘disjunctures’ that remind us 
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‘“you never know what you are actually [confronting]”’.155 These methods promise to 
preserve the possibility of different ways of coexisting – they are political but not engaged in 
any particular politics. 
 
There are good reasons to be sceptical about such claims. As other time scholars note, it is 
exceedingly difficult to invoke time and temporality without evoking political commitments. 
Hutchings finds temporal patterns with implicit politics lurking in any international political 
theory,156 while Tim Stevens argues that ‘chronopolitics is embedded within all our notions 
of how society operates and how it might be characterized. This applies not only to the 
chronotypical imaginings of political elites but to those who would resist them and to our own 
analyses.’157 These points link back to language games, in which any ‘type of language’ – 
even that of openness and contingency – ‘not only provides descriptors but also incorporates 
moral judgment.’158 The discourse of rupture is a language game in its own right, which 
implicitly replaces extant systems of meaning with ‘a new type of “game”’ with ‘ethical 
commitments to expose and disrupt, at a minimum, or to change in favor of a vaguely 
defined “better” alternative, at a maximum, unequal relations of power.’159 It is necessary, 
therefore, to ask ‘what sorts of politics IR scholars are involved in when they explore 
alternative possibilities’ through times of rupture.160  
 
While undeniably different from ‘linear’ or ‘timeless’ visions of politics, critical invocations 
of ‘rupture’, ‘disjuncture’, and ‘disruption’ share a basic functional similarity with dominant 
temporalities. All express the human capacity for transmitting meaning and establishing 
relationships.161 Furthermore, as self-consciously political interventions, rupturous 
temporalities at least imply a preferred way of cohabiting the world or gesture at a valuation 
somewhere between different and better.162 The substance of these political commitments 
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remains hidden in rupture discourse’s disavowal of interpretation and re-direction. This 
situation engenders four temporal tensions.  
 
First, while ruptured time may be important to think, it is exceedingly hard to live. Rupture 
links closely to ‘trauma time’, a violent betrayal rendering interpretive and practical resources 
ineffectual. While developing ethical methods for ‘encircling’ trauma, Edkins also 
acknowledges that trauma victims are incapacitated by this fractured moment.163 They are in 
effect suspended between ‘the now of the living present, … and the anonymous now, 
produced by any break in the continuity of change’, which, absent interpretation, reduces us 
from a ‘life … lived as a coherent and consecutive “whole”’ to a ‘“sensate” and incoherent 
living from day to day in fragments.’164 Lived time unfolds relative to something rather than 
everything. In practical terms, the latter equates with nothing – a crippling blank slate 
admitting no ‘which’ amongst its innumerable ‘whats.’165 As radical breaks, ruptures are full 
of – i.e. constituted by – possibility. In related research on identity and social action, this 
situation presents a serious problem. To be human is to confront perpetually the anxiety and 
indeterminacy of dynamic environments.166 However, to find in this condition a self-
sufficient validation of radical contingency and the breakdown of ‘the very logic of 
meaningful situations’167 impoverishes lived experience, which works instead to reduce 
contingency by taking ownership of a ‘domain of envisioned possibilities which, to be 
meaningful, must be understood to be believed.’168 Although many critical scholars are ‘wary 
of any “reconstructed” power/knowledge nexus’ by which this might occur,169  this does not 
vitiate the pragmatic fact that ‘reconstruction is essential to the conduct of an intelligent 
being.’170 Ruptures and pure events overflow with potential whereas lived time concerns 
‘possible-being’ and ‘room for manoeuvre’, a sense of how we might become otherwise from 
where and when we find ourselves.171 It depends on some minimal intelligibility, some 
connection – however tenuous – to what we already understand about the world and its 
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temporal elements. A rupture might reset our experiential clocks to ‘time zero’ but remaining 
with trauma and utter indeterminacy offers us no time at all.172 
 
Second, although full of possibility, ruptured time often gets defined by its other, by what it is 
not. Rupture’s appeal rests on its capacity to disrupt extant ‘limits’ in IR like the ‘linear time’ 
of the nation-state.173 In part, this has to do with heterotemporality, insofar as rupture opens 
room for ‘difference’ per se in the state’s unity project. But it also depends on a particular 
interpretive shift that passes without note in critical IR. From the quote above, a rupture ‘does 
not fit any particular system of knowledge’ and exposes ‘the limits of any attempt to grasp or 
“comprehend” the event through, for example, long-term processes and largescale 
patterns.’174 Similarly, the ‘processes of capture’ that re-inscribe or close down ruptures are 
‘the exceptional security measures of the “war on terror”: indefinite detention, Abu Ghraib, 
Guantanamo, water-boarding, CIA prison flights, NSA surveillance programs, and so on.’175 
These shifts summon out of the interpretive void examples associated primarily with the 
hegemonic state and mainstream IR. They also obscure the issue of uninhabitability by 
reifying hegemonic times as baselines against which rupture appears different, dissident, and 
salutary. Finally, they turn the aforementioned problem of time and its longstanding 
association with dissolution into a force naturally opposed to dominant logics. Put simply, 
they exchange one temporal presumption for another. 
 
Third, and flowing from this, radical openness is not necessarily better, much less good. 
‘Possibility’, ‘openness’, ‘alternatives’, and ‘something that is yet to emerge and yet to be 
known’176 all give off a strong whiff of optimism. Pure possibilities and open pathways can 
break many ways, and ‘[t]here are no guarantees’ that engaging disruptive times ‘will 
produce the result we desire’ or even one we can accept.177 Moreover, novel forms of harm 
and radical evil are also alternatives. Or are we to believe that the Holocaust was 
unsurpassable? That neoliberal economics, national security, and democratic-peace wars 
mark the ne plus ultra of subordination and ‘violent response’? Are we to forget that 
disrupting the ‘inertia of [the] status quo’ so as to ‘open space for a new political 
reconfiguration’ might cash out as President Trump, xenophobia, and the fresh possibility of 
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nuclear war?178 All of these possibilities inhere in rupture’s virtual potential. Yet whether by 
wilful sublimation or the aforementioned habit of framing ruptures solely against hegemonic 
counterparts, they remain absent in critical discourse. 
 
Fourth, and relatedly, in practice the discourse of ‘pure’ rupture is positional and particular. 
Breaks in the smooth flow of time look very different depending on where you stand, who 
you are, and what you pursue. For one example, the nation-state backdrop – that benefactor 
and beneficiary of ‘linear time’ against which rupture appears salutary – owes its prominence 
to alternative politics arising after the breakdown of feudal orders and the Reformation. It 
was, initially, an effort to reduce radical contingency, inhibit subordination and violence, and 
craft ‘something new’ in support of religious and other differences during a time of 
rupture.179 That it did so by papering over numerous other disjunctures qualifies rather than 
vitiates this historical dynamic.  
 
For another example, consider the rupture-based reading of 9/11:  
 
Before the movements of the planes crashing into the World Trade Center and the 
Pentagon became “9/11”, before they received their name and date, and before they 
were placed in a larger historical context and narrative structure, they were singular 
events, … [which] eluded frameworks of representation and highlighted something 
wholly other and incomprehensible, which disrupted the “modern” present and the 
sovereign voice of reason …180  
 
This reading of 9/11 as rupture only makes sense from the particular viewpoint of Anglo-
American hegemony. It would be unrecognizable to the al Qaeda hijackers, Osama bin 
Laden, and those who supported the substantial preparations required to produce these 
‘singular events.’ For them, these ‘movements’ were more like ‘a culmination of history’181 
or a closure of sorts located – and indeed conceived of – ‘in a larger historical context and 
narrative structure’ or representative framework drawn from a peculiar political theology. 
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That is, one group’s rupture is another’s ‘fullness of time.’  
 
The rapture of rupture 
Uninhabitable, defined by its other, conflating novel with better, and unavoidably positional – 
in spite of these tensions rupture enjoys a prominent place in the critical discourse of time. 
How, then, does it actually work in that discourse? What explains its theoretical punch? I 
think the answer is a deeply embedded liberal-idealism. To be clear, this is not the 
neoliberalism of late modernity or the Kantian triad of democracy, interdependence, and 
multilateralism.182 Rather, rupture recalls the classic liberal commitment to the value and 
rights of the individual and the consequent responsibilities of sovereign states.183 Nor is it 
idealist in an ideational or strictly philosophical sense. Rather, I refer to a tendency to abstract 
ethical aspirations into theoretical assumptions while ignoring the concrete realities of 
political power, indeterminacy, and unintended consequences.184 Without substantive 
content, these notions appear relevant to most situations but offer little practical traction 
because all the heavy lifting is done by assumptions, abstractions, or productive silences. In 
the case of critical IR, we might think of this liberal-idealism as the rapture of rupture. 
 
First, the liberalism embedded in rupture. Critical scholars declare a commitment only to the 
‘politics … [of] an active process of drawing and experimenting with lines, without having 
any preestablished lines—of history, society, and the world—to fall back on.’185 This springs 
from their fear of ‘reinforcing practices of security and violent forms of response.’186 But 
why should we eschew security practices and violence – two august aspects of politics – 
unless we build on some preestablished lines authorizing the importance of human 
individuals and viewing the state as a threat rather than a security provider and/or realization 
of collective will? Other critical scholars draw these lines from the ‘politically affirmative 
and progressive nature of deconstructive thought, as revealed through its onto-political 
character,’187 which acknowledges a commitment to choosing a which among many possible 
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whats. This sort of progressivism wordlessly underwrites claims that in ruptures wake, ‘the 
only guiding principle is that of multiplicity itself’, which prioritizes ‘difference’ and 
‘singularity’ but presumably not different violence or singular evil.188 Moreover, it gives 
proposals to  experiment with ‘more productive and creative’ approaches the gloss of self-
sufficiency by orienting us toward welcome possibilities rather than novel forms of 
depredation. In these ways, times of rupture depend on classically liberal sensibilities, where 
the intrinsic value of human individuals makes it important to speak for the powerless, the 
marginalized, the non-elite and the ‘professionals of nothing.’189 This is entirely consistent 
with the earlier point that every temporality reflects particular purposes and works according 
to specific standards of reference. Critical scholars acknowledge this partway, noting that 
experimentation ‘can be said to express a particular ethics of the event, an ethics of trying to 
encounter the ambiguities and uncertainties of the pure event in a more productive and 
creative way.’190 Yet as an ethics, this involves some aspect of reconstruction, just as any 
critique implies or begs a substantive vision of an alternate future.191  
 
However, such liberal and ethical impulses create tensions in times of rupture. As one liberal 
theorist notes, liberalism makes little sense ‘as an arena for the unfettered expression of 
“difference”’; its distinctiveness ‘lies not in the absence but, rather, in the content of its 
public purposes’ and how they privilege individuals and diversity.192 This is not multiplicity 
and possibility as such but rather from ‘a view of the human good that favours certain ways 
of life and tilts against others.’193 Without that ‘tilt’, experimenting with times of rupture 
becomes ‘a circular exercise, repeated for itself but with no effect, no life force, and no bite 
beyond the choir to whom it preaches.’194 Or worse, it opens room for novel forms of harm. 
 
This is where idealism becomes crucial to ruptured times. As various champions insist, 
rupture concerns only an engagement with possibility, thinking about what another politics 
might require to open up genuine alternatives. Even though other political agents are busy 
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‘recompos[ing] and reassert[ing]’ interpretive frameworks in rupture’s wake,195 critical 
advocates are unwilling to ‘subordinate the mysteries of time to specific notions of historical 
change.’196 Like other engagements with, say, protest cultures, there is a palpable ‘optimism 
for change’ here; one ‘rooted squarely in [the] refusal to describe what form a newly 
imagined politics might take’ and thus ‘defined only by its unconventionality.’197 Novelty 
and possibility as such only resonate as preferable if we assume they encourage spontaneous 
improvement by virtue of their ‘extra-discursive’ or ‘natural state, a kind of protean fecundity 
that exists in idealized form in isolation from politics as it is usually lived.’198 Moreover, this 
frames violence and subordination as intrinsically old and positive pluralism as resolutely 
new. Ironically, then, given critical scholars’ resistance to imagined ‘temporal borders’ and 
avowed interest in ‘a radical critique of the contingent “ground(ing)”’ of modernity,199 the 
value of rupture depends upon a thoroughly modern form of temporal delineation. 
 
These silent assumptions and hidden logics help ‘characterize’ and thus ‘control’ times of 
rupture,200 transforming it from a description of traumatic and unlivable conditions to the 
foundation of a novel ethics that insists we ‘remain with uncertainty’ and ‘hope that 
something different’ will emerge.201 They are what take us from difference itself to a future 
‘deemed worthy of being aspired towards.’202 They thus obscure the need to make 
alternatives tangible, which is vital for critique’s sake and for the everyday politics of 
individuals who do not enjoy the privilege of remaining in sheer contingency and 
indeterminacy.203 And they inhibit any evaluation of ruptured time as a ‘practical question’ 
of what it actually ‘does’, its ‘effects’, and how it works.204 
 
To drive this point home, recall an earlier vision of novelty and difference tinged by tragedy. 
Hannah Arendt embraced ‘natality’ as moments of pure possibility but insisted these be 
tempered by a political sensitivity to potentially catastrophic unintended consequences. Each 
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birth, in her formulation, is ‘uniquely new’ but includes no guarantees – ‘authentic’ novelty 
might be ‘all-destructive.’205 Ignoring these implications depoliticizes and gentrifies novelty 
and leaves us poorly prepared to resist depredation when it (re-) emerges.206 Only by ignoring 
or sublimating the heavy lifting can critical scholars pass over a ‘rainbow bridge’207 of sorts 
that turns the start of the political problem – radical change – into the self-sufficient 
conclusion of ‘another politics’, which occludes the need to reduce contingency while 
avoiding catastrophe. So while deeply suspicious of promises to ‘take us from here to there’ 
or move us from past through present toward a better future,208 the critical discourse of 
rupture works – like the rapture itself – on the assumption ‘of being carried onward or swept 
along’ by ‘forces of movement’ that emerge independent of conscious effort.209 The rapture 
of rupture thus marks a missed opportunity, beginning with a legitimately ‘different 
perspective on time and politics’210 but producing a concept with ‘little relevance to life’211 
because it demurs at precisely the point when it becomes necessary to lean on the scales, to 
encourage this time (or these times) instead of that and thereby privilege some purposes and 
politics over others. Ruptures are golden opportunities to develop another, better politics – as 
such they require more than hope, nebulous experimentation,212 or the refusal to say any 
more than ‘what I think it does for me.’213 Unless we think novel harms impossible and better 
outcomes naturally assured, ruptures mark a moment when it is vital to wilfully construct or 
at least delimit political time anew.214 
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Conclusion  
This paper tracked four discursive habits – routinized denunciations of ‘timelessness’ and 
‘linear time’ complemented by ritual incantations of ‘heterotemporality’ and ‘rupture’ – that 
constitute the temporal turn in critical IR. Each depended upon shared but silent assumptions 
to make sense; for various reasons each de-cohered under closer inspection. Underspecified 
references to timelessness and linear time totalize, reify, and inhibit understanding of the 
complex relationships between different times and different hegemonic logics and practices. 
Alternative times remain fuzzy and isolated from each other. And claims about ‘possibility’, 
‘creativity’, and ‘novelty’ in the discourse of rupture depend upon an idealised, even 
rapturous assumption that indeterminacy and contingency will spontaneously produce 
another (i.e. better) politics.  
 
Taken together these temporal habits constitute a set of identity commitments: we critical 
scholars reject timeless theories and the linear time of the state, whatever those might actually 
be; we embrace time pluralism and rupture, whatever those might actually mean. This does 
not negate the incisive works discussed above. Rather, it demonstrates how much easier it is 
to apprehend the times of politics than to comprehend them. In this sense, we are all 
Augustinians. The problems arise when lack of reflexivity about this situation reinforces 
silent doxas, which in turn reduce temporal analysis to loose theorizing and rhetorical 
provocation and inhibit our ability to put time in dialogue with a wider range of interlocutors 
and political phenomena.  
 
For example, recent work in historical institutionalism develops explicitly temporal 
propositions about institutions. These include sequencing, path dependence, critical junctures, 
legacy and lock-in effects, creative action, and the influence of founding moments on 
institutional identities, which inhibit radical change in ways that renders institutions both 
‘inefficient’ and able to ‘outlive their original rationale.’215 This cursory glance highlights 
opportunities for dialogue with the critical works discussed above. Do sequences, path 
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dependencies, and legacy effects recapitulate sovereign unilinear time or complicate it by 
identifying multiple temporalities in competition with each other in the international system? 
Do feedback loops require a background linear time or – as they become stickier – do they 
mark cyclical and even ‘timeless’ phenomena? How do institutions turn ruptures into critical 
junctures? Do junctures and founding moments preserve some trace of their originating 
rupture that affords creative opportunities to contest institutional power? What does the 
tendency of institutions to outlive their animating purpose tell us about the broader workings 
of temporal power in international politics? Are institutions more heterotemporal than 
historical institutionalists realize? Despite these points of contact, historical institutionalists 
and critical IR’s time scholars are not yet speaking to each other. Moreover, it is difficult to 
imagine how they would without a concerted effort to more fully explicate and differentiate 
the times of powerful international actors, something that critical habits impede.216 
 
Likewise, for many years foreign policy analysis (FPA) scholars have considered factors with 
clear temporal dynamics. These include crisis situations, cognitive and group processes under 
time pressure, decision stages and ‘occasions for decision’, and historical analogies.217 Once 
again, even this briefest of surveys indicates promising avenues between FPA and critical 
time studies. Hutchings’ analytical framework bears directly on decision making contexts 
insofar as chronos describes the homogeneous, orderly and seemingly objective flow of time 
and kairos refers to qualitatively unique moments of opportunity when decisive action can 
steer or transform the arc of history.218 Theories of the event concern how we interpret and 
inscribe the flux of immediate experience within a conceptual apparatus that allows us to 
apprehend what is happening now. This points to FPA interests in stages, sequences, and the 
very perception of crises as such.219 Moreover, what are crises if not ruptures in the fabric of 
ordinary policy processes? More generally, critical IR’s emphasis on the variable, 
intersubjective nature of political time resounds with psychological approaches to FPA. 
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Despite these opportunities, critical IR and FPA scholars have not engaged much and 
certainly not across their shared concern with time.220 Doing so would once again require an 
effort to meet in the middle, but perhaps even more than historical institutionalism, there are 
promising time paths between these two literatures that could productively mobilize their 
shared challenge to rational actor assumptions and purely static and structural accounts of 
international politics.221 
 
If the temporal turn is indeed worth taking, and I believe it is, then we should make the most 
of its potential. Temporal phenomena lurk in nearly every corner of global politics and a 
variety of IR scholars are taking notice. Critical IR can offer them an invaluable collection of 
perspectives on the diversity, fluidity, and possibilities housed in time. But it is precisely 
these assets that recommend a more sensitive treatment of language, clearer links between 
various concepts of time, and a more forthright discussion of their politics. One key lesson of 
critical IR’s temporal turn is that time bears on numerous researches. It can be a synthetic 
resource. Yet to date the critical discourse of time tends toward insularity and isolation rather 
than openness and integration. Becoming more reflexive about its tensions and contradictions 
can help grant time the place it deserves in IR while positioning critical perspectives at the 
heart of these developments. So while my arguments might seem like strictures that hobble 
critical research, they are not calls to put on the brakes. Instead, they are a way to downshift, 
to avoid centrifugal pull while harnessing centripetal power. That, after all, is how a turn 
generates maximum momentum. 
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